A couple of my musings of late... I. Can the necessary ever come from the contingent? It seems not, as that which is contingent may have either been or not been, depending upon it's cause. A thing which depends upon it's cause will either be or not be depending on whether it's cause was present. A necessary thing must be (by definition), and so, if it depends upon some cause, then that cause must also be necessary. Therefore, since the contingent is unnecessary, the necessary may not come from the contingent. II. Can an opinion ever be an ethic? 1. It seems it can, as the utilitarians tell us that what is good is what brings man the most pleasure. Now, the decision as to what brings man the most pleasure must depend on what particular men decide is pleasurable. Since the good would then depend on what particular men tell us they find pleasurable, and such may be opinions as well as true, it seems that ethics can indeed come from opinions. 2. Moreover, we find that there is great disagreement on how one ought live, and since they can not all be right, and since all the assertions other than the correct one (if any ARE correct) would be called opinions rather than true, it seems that ethics can come from opinion. 3. Moroever, when a man steals to give to the poor, the goodness or badness of this act seems to depend upon whether the stealing is seen as worse or better than the charity, and since this describes an opinion, it seems an opinion can be an ethic. 4. Moreover, when a man pulls the trigger on a gun, this only may or may not result in an evil act of murder, depending upon what is aimed at. The goodness or badness of simply pulling a trigger then, and it's result, seems to be open to opinion. But against that, as shown above, nothing necessary can come from the contingent. Now an ethic is something which ought be done irregardless, and is thus a necessity. Opinions, however, are contingent upon the men who put them forth, and those men are further contingent upon their parents and their own causes. Therefore, no opinion may ever be an ethic. In reply, although the position of ethical relativism asserts that ethics is indeed dependent upon the opinions of men, it seems that they may only say this by misdefining what an ethic is. Morality and ethics, whether or not there truely are such things, is understood as that which must necessarily be chosen. They are understood as the correct choices, and as such, would have to be prior to men themselves to make sense as a neccessary standard of conduct. Hence, (to 1) although the utilitarians would try to escape opinion in finding their virtues, it would indeed seem they rely on opinion. What the utilitarians are calling their virtues then, would not properly be called virtue or ethic, but an arbitrary goal, as what men do find pleasurable can not answer the question of what they ought find pleasurable. (to 2) What is thought ought to be done and what truely ought to be done are two different questions, and to confuse them would be to commit the is-ought fallacy; therefore, the opinion of the masses can not be used to defend what truely ought to be chosen. (to 3) And again, as was just said, although a good act and a bad act may be committed, neither the opinions of men, nor the fact that they were done by the same man, would change the goodness or badness of the acts in themselves. Since this argument confuses opinions about what ought be done with the question of what truely ought be done, we can dismiss it thus. (to 4) Lastly, although some may say that what makes a seeingly neutral act, like pulling a trigger, incorrect is contingent upon what the trigger is on (a gun), and what the gun is pointed toward, such a position would be confusing the correctness of the goal of the actor with some aspect of the act itself. Ethics properly deals with what a man ought and ought not intend to do, and this would answer this complaint.