Argument #3: The Omniscience/Free Will problem The third argument against the existence of God can also be viewed as an argument against the notion of Free Will within a Christian context, and is stated as thus: Since God is omniscient, He must know all that will ever be. However, if this is so, then He must know all that human kind will ever do. This implies that no matter what one may choose to do, God will know what will be chosen. This, however, seems to suggest that man does not have Free Will. However, man does have Free Will, therefore God can not be omniscient. God is understood as being omniscient, and therefore, if man has Free Will, then there is no God. Let us examine the assertion concerning Free Will first, as it is most clearly agreed upon by both proponents and opponents of this argument. Free Will is understood as being the faculty of man such that for any given choice (not necessarily a physical act), an opposing choice could have been made also. That is to say that all choices, regardless of whether they result in some act, are possible in the will of man. This would be contrasted with a fatalistic view, such as that of the moderns, where outside forces determine every choice of animals and man. On this point there is no dispute. Christianity asserts man's Free Will nature, and this argument proports to use it as one of its premises. On the matter concerning the omniscience of God, we understand this as referring simply to knowing all that can be known. Now knowledge refers to notions which are true, so that it is the case that God knows all that is true. Since a choice made by a man begats a true assertion, that "person such-and-such chose to do such-and-such." for instance, we derive then the explicit premise of the argument, that God knows all acts that men will choose to do. This would include acts not yet done, since they too can be phrased as assertions which may be true or false. If God knows them, they will be true. The central question then becomes this: does knowledge of something which is not yet done imply determination. For this, we must first investigate the relationship of God's knowledge to nature. In the Christian sense, God is understood not only as omniscient, but as eternal. This is commonly understood as referring to one who lives forever, but since God is the creator, for Him it can also be said that He exists always. The position of God's eternal nature, however, is slightly more complicated than this. We also say that God is omnipresent, or everywhere at once. In the same way, regarding God's eternal nature, we say He is omnitemporal, or everyWHEN at once. God, therefore, has knowledge of future events not simply as an idea, but because he has "seen" that future-- He is already there. Now, the matter of future knowledge implying determination is simply stated thus "If something is known before it will occur, then that something is determined." Is this assertion self evident? If it is, then any counter example must be an absurdity. However, aside from being unlikely, the notion of a crystal ball is not logically absurd. Let it stand then that the central assertion is not itself self evident. As a questionable premise, then, we can be content to let it fall by, unproven. We can further demonstrate the questionable nature of the central premise by bringing back in the above discussion on God's view of nature. From an intemporal perspective, God can be understood as knowing events in nature in totality, as one grand idea, since one can not say of an intemporal being that he sees event X and THEN event Y ("then" implies some passage of time, while God sees all events "at once"). We might say, as an analogy, that although we read the end of the mystery novel first, this does not imply that the writer was forced to write it that way. In the same way, God's view of nature intemporally says nothing about how the events came about. Further, this view says nothing IN ITSELF about God's relationship to the _existence_ of the things He views. Some He may be reponsible for, and some He may not. Now, the notion of Free Will implies that the actor is responsible for the choices of his will. It may be said then that God is not responsible for some of what he views (that which we choose), even if he participates in them by providing for the existence of the willing actor himself. In this way then, by providing for the possibility of a counter to the central premise of the argument, we throw the argument itself into question.